A continuous-variable measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (CV-MDI QKD) protocol using squeezed states is proposed, where the two legitimate partners send Gaussian-modulated squeezed states to an untrusted third party. Security analysis shows that the protocol can not only defend all detector side channels but also attain higher secret key rates than coherent-state based protocol. We also present a method to improve the squeezed-state CV-MDI QKD protocol by adding proper Gaussian noise in reconciliation side. It is found that there is an optimal added noise to optimize the performance of the protocol, in terms of both key rates and maximal transmission distances. The resulting protocol shows the potential of long distance secure communication using CV-MDI QKD protocol.
achievable two-mode squeezing in a stable optical configuration has already reached about 10 dB [16] , and an experiment using CV-QKD protocol with squeezed states and homodyne detection has been successfully demonstrated [5, 17] , which shows the potential of implementing the squeezed-state CV-QKD in real life.
In this paper, we introduce the use of squeezed state into a recently proposed protocol, continuous-variable measurement-device-independent QKD (CV-MDI QKD) [18, 19] which can defend all detector side channels. We first present the equivalent entanglement-based (EB) scheme and prepare-and-measure (PM) scheme of the squeezed-state CV-MDI QKD, and show that the EB scheme is secure against collective attacks under asymptotic case. We find that the transmission distance of squeezed-state CV-MDI QKD protocol is longer than the coherent-state based protocol. In addition, we introduce the trusted added noise model to the receiver, which can further improve the transmission distance. Furthermore, in the most asymmetric case even if the variance of the EPR is as small as 5.04 (referring to 10 dB squeezing [20] ), the transmission distance can still reach 100.5 km, which shows the potential of actually implementing the CV-MDI QKD protocol using squeezed states.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we propose a CV-MDI QKD protocol using squeezed states. We optimize the CV-MDI QKD protocol using squeezed states by adding optimal Gaussian noise in reconciliation side in Sec. III. In Sec. IV, we show the numerical simulation results of secret key rate and give the optimal value of the added noise under different situations. Our conclusions are drawn in Sec. V.
II. SQUEEZED-STATE CV-MDI QKD
In this section, we first present the idea and basic notions of the CV-MDI QKD protocol using squeezed states and then derive secure bound of the protocol. The standard PM description of the CV-MDI QKD protocol using squeezed states is shown in Fig. 1 and described as follows:
Alice
Step 1. Alice and Bob randomly draw values x A (p A ) and x B (p B ) from two Gaussian distributed set with 0 mean and variance V A − 1 and V B − 1, respectively, and use these numbers to modulate x-quadrature (p-quadrature) of the squeezed state. Then they send theses states to the untrusted third party (Charlie) through two different quantum channels.
Step 2.Charlie combines received two modes A ′ and B ′ with a beam splitter (50:50) and the output modes of the beam splitter are C and D. Then he measures x-quadrature of mode C and p-quadrature of mode D by homodyne detectors and publicly announces the measurement results x C , p D to Alice and Bob through classical channels.
Step 3. After receiving Charlie's measurement results
Step 4. Once Alice and Bob have collected a sufficiently large correlated data, they first do parameter estimation from a randomly chosen sample of final data x A (p A ) and
. Then Alice and Bob proceed with classical data postprocessing namely, information reconciliation and privacy amplification using an authenticated public channel. The reconciliation can be done in two ways: either direct reconciliation (DR) or reverse reconciliation (RR).
The PM description presented above is equivalent to the entanglement-based (EB) scheme shown in Fig. 2 . Although the EB version does not correspond to the actual implementation, it is fully equivalent to the PM version from the secure point of view, and it provides a powerful description of establishing security proof [21] . The EB scheme of the proposed CV-MDI QKD using squeezed states can be described as follows:
Step 4 to get the final data {x B (p B )} using homodyne detection which randomly detects x-quadrature or p-quadrature. Alice also measures the mode A 3 to get the final data {x A (p A )} using homodyne detection.
Step 4. Once Alice and Bob have collected a sufficiently large correlated data, they use an authenticated public channel to do parameter estimation from a randomly chosen sample of final data {x A , p A } and {x B , p B }. Then Alice and Bob proceed with classical data postprocessing namely information reconciliation and privacy amplification to distill a secret key. The reconciliation can be done in two ways: either direct reconciliation (DR) or reverse reconciliation (RR).
The detector's imperfection is characterized by quantum efficiency η and electronic noise υ el , which is shown in Fig. 2 . The variance υ 1,2 of the thermal state ρ F 0 and ρ I 0 is chosen to obtain the appropriate expression for practical homodyne detection υ 1,2 = 1 + υ el /(1 − η) [22] .
From the analysis above, one can find that the EB scheme proposed here shares the same demonstration with the one in [18] except for that what measurements Alice and Bob use are substituted by homodyne detection. Thus, the EB scheme discussed here is equivalent to the conventional CV-QKD with squeezed states and homodyne detection. The (asymptotical) secret key rate K against collective attacks for reverse reconciliation is given by [23] 
where β ∈ [0, 1] is the reconciliation efficiency, I(A : B) is the classical mutual information between Alice and Bob, χ(B : E) are the Holevo quantity [24] χ (B :
where S (ρ) is the von 
where G(x) = (x + 1) log 2 (x + 1) − x log 2 x, λ 1−2 are the symplectic eigenvalues of the covariance matrix γ A 3 B 4 and λ 3 is the symplectic eigenvalues of the covariance matrix γ A 3 |x B .
As discussed above, in experiment Alice and Bob can get the covariance matrix γ A 3 B 4 from parameter estimation step. The covariance matrix γ A 3 B 4 depends on the system and the gain of the displacement, which is written as
where I n is the n × n identity matrix and σ z = diag (1, -1). The symplectic eigenvalues λ 1−2 of the above matrix are given by
where we have used the notations
The symplectic eigenvalues λ 3 of the matrix γ 0) ), after Bob homodyne measurement, is given by 
III. MODIFIED SQUEEZED-STATE CV-MDI QKD
In this section, we propose a modified CV-MDI QKD protocol using squeezed states by adding proper classical Gaussian noise in reconciliation side (Alice's side for the direct reconciliation protocol or Bob's side for the reverse reconciliation protocol). The EB scheme of the modified protocol is illustrated in Fig. 3 , where Alice and Bob implement the original squeezed-state CV-MDI QKD protocol as we proposed in the last section but Bob adds some Gaussian phase-insensitive noise before his homodyne detection.
In the EB scheme, the added Gaussian phase-insensitive noise is modeled by mixing the original mode B 4 with a thermal state (half of an EPR) of variance N R by a beam splitter of transmissivity T R (χ N = (1 − T R ) N R /T R ). In the corresponding PM scheme, the added noise means that Bob adding proper classical Gaussian noise of variance χ N = (1 − T R ) N R /T R before sending the modulated squeezed states to Charlie.
Then we follow the analysis of Sec. II for collective attacks, but it is clear from Fig. 3 that two additional modes N 1 and N 3 need to be included in the calculation. By replacing the Eq. 3, χ (B : E) is calculated from the following equation:
where λ 1−2 keeps the same as the Eq. 5 while λ 3−5 represents the symplectic eigenvalues of the covariance matrix γ A 3 N 1 N 3 |x B , which is given by
where the matrices γ A 3 N 1 N 3 , γ B 5 and σ A 3 N 1 N 3 B 5 can all be derived from the decomposition of the matrix
The above matrix can be derived with appropriate rearrangement of lines and columns from the matrix describing the system in Fig. 3 γ 
IV. NUMERICAL SIMULATION AND DISCUSSION
In the section, the performance of the proposed and the modified squeezed-state CV-MDI QKD protocol is illustrated and compared with the coherent-state based protocol [18, 19] .
As discussed above, in practical experiment, Alice and Bob can get the covariance matrix γ to simulate the channels' environment (two independent entangling cloner attacks) and Charlie's measurement (standard Bell-state measurement), which is illustrated in Fig. 2 . The relationships are as follows:
The parameters that will affect the secret key rate are the reconciliation efficiency β, the variance of Alice's and Bob's modulation V A − 1, V B − 1, the transmission efficiency T 1 , T 2 , excess noise ε 1 , ε 2 of two quantum channels, the inefficiency η and the electronic noise υ el of the practical homodyne detector. Here we first choose large variance V A = V B = 10 5 to see the performance of ideal modulation, then we will use the practical variance V A = V B = 5.04 to see the realistic performance. Excess noise ε 1 = ε 2 = ε = 0.002, T 1 = 10 −αL AC /10 , T 2 = 10 −αL BC /10 (α = 0.2 dB/km) for simulation, which are standard parameters in one-way CV-QKD experiment [6] . Furthermore, we use η = 1, υ el = 0 representing for the perfect homodyne detector and η = 0.9, υ el = 0.015 for the imperfect detector.
Firstly, we consider the performance of symmetric case where the length of two quantum channels are equal (L AC = L BC ). We calculate the secret key rate K as a function of transmission distance d = L AC = L BC with perfect detectors or imperfect detectors. The simulation results are shown in Fig. 4 , where we also calculate CV-MDI-QKD protocol using coherent states [18] for comparison. We find that the secret key rate of the squeezed-state CV-MDI QKD protocol is always larger than coherent-state based protocol. Explicitly, the total maximal transmission distance (L AB = L AC + L BC ) of our squeezed-state CV-MDI QKD protocol increases both 6.1 km using perfect detectors and imperfect detectors than coherent-state based protocol. Furthermore, by adding proper Gaussian noise in Bob's side, the performance of the modified squeezed-state CV-MDI QKD protocol improves. The total maximal transmission distance increases both more 1.3 km and the optimal added noise is illustrated in Fig. 5 . We also observe that the imperfections of the homodyne detector decrease L AB , i. e. , using η = 0.9, υ el = 0.015 homodyne detectors decrease L AB 7.2 km for the modified squeezed-state CV-MDI QKD protocol. Secondly, we also find when Charlie's position is close to Bob, the total maximal transmission distance L AB will increase to a relatively longer distance. Thus, here we also consider the performance of the asymmetric case where L AC L BC . As illustrated in Fig. 6 , L AB increases when L BC decreases. In the asymmetric case, the performance of the modified squeezed-state CV-MDI QKD protocol is also improved by adding proper noise in Bob's side. The optimal input noise can enhance L AB to 91.2 km when using perfect detectors and 20.0 km when using imperfect detectors. Then we change the variance from ideal (V A = V B = 10 5 ) to practical one (V A = V B = 5.04), which is shown in Fig. 7 . The total maximal transmission distance L AB can also reach 84.4 km using perfect detectors and 13.7 km using imperfect detectors, which allows one to directly use the EPR state as the source in a practical experiment. And if Alice and Bob use EPR sources, the squeezed-state CV-MDI QKD protocol will be more secure because they could completely outplay sidechannel attacks in their private spaces [25] . Compared with the performance of using perfect and imperfect detectors, we find that the inefficiency and electronic noise of the practical homodyne detector have a significant influence on the trans- mission distance. It is possible that these imperfections can be compensated by optical phase-sensitive-amplifiers [26, 27] .
Finally, we consider the performance of the most asymmetric case where we put Charlie in Bob's side (L BC = 0km). As illustrated in Fig. 8 , L AB increases dramatically compared with symmetric case. In the most asymmetric case, the secret key rate of the squeezed-state CV-MDI QKD protocol is always larger than coherent-state based protocol. The total maximal transmission distance increases 15.7 km and 10.5 km when using perfect detectors and imperfect detectors. Furthermore, the modified squeezed-state CV-MDI QKD proto- col achieves optimal performance than the original protocol by adding proper noise in Bob's side, i. e. , L AB increases more 4.9 km and 3.3 km. The optimal input noise is illustrated in Fig. 9 . The reason of the improvement is that the added noise not only lowers the mutual information between Alice and Bob, but also lowers that between Eve and Bob. When the influence on Eve and Bob is stronger than that on Alice and Bob, the secret key rate is enhanced and the performance is improved.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a continuous-variable measurement-device-independent QKD protocol using squeezed states, which outperforms the coherent-state based protocol, in terms of secret key rate and maximal transmission distance. Security analysis shows that the protocol is immune to attacks against the detector and secure against arbitrary collective attacks in the asymptotical limit. Furthermore, we have also presented a method to optimize the performance of the squeezed-state continuous-variable measurement-deviceindependent QKD protocol by adding proper Gaussian noise in reconciliation side. It is found that there is an optimal noise Bob need to add to maximal the secret key rate and total transmission distance for the reverse reconciliation protocol. The resulting protocol exhibits the optimal performance and shows the potential of long distance secure communication using continuous-variable measurement-device-independent QKD protocol. We restricted our discussion to collectiveattack cases in this paper. Since the protocol using squeezed states and homodyne detection is also shown to be secure against coherent attacks in the finite-size regime [28, 29] , an interesting extension to this work would be to further derive the security bound against coherent attacks.
